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ABSTRACT
History has taught us that real estate markets are cyclical in
nature. As a result of the economic decline in the Southwest
during the 1980s, development companies in Texas have
diversified and restructured their organizations. They have
evolved from speculative builders into full service real
estate companies.
It is important for investors, developers and other
professionals involved in real estate to understand the
cyclical nature of their business. Why? Change in market
conditions creates opportunities. Investors or developers who
foresee change prior to their competition may be able to
position themselves to take advantage of the change. This
thesis explores the changes which occurred in the real estate
markets in Texas during the 1980s and evaluates the reactions
of developers.
Chapter One, "From Boom to Bust," explains the cyclical nature
of real estate. It summarizes the "glory days" in Texas real
estate from the late 1970s to the early 1980s, and examines
the causes behind the decline. Chapter Two, "The Initial
Reaction," evaluates how and why developers reacted to the
deteriorating market conditions in the early stages of
decline. Chapter Three, "Restructuring," examines how
developers have altered the structure of their operations,
marketing, ownership, and financial obligations. Chapter
Four, "Diversification," looks at how developers have
attempted to mitigate risk and create other sources of
revenue. Chapter Five, "Conclusion," summarizes the changes
within the industry over the decade of the 1980s and the
lessons which can be learned from the experience of developers
during this time period.
Thesis Supervisor: Gloria Schuck
Title: Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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INTRODUCTION
No market in the United States is immune to the cyclical
nature of real estate. New York, Boston, Atlanta, Detroit and
other cities have experienced down cycles, however, none to
the extent which Texas did in the 1980s. During this decade
there were sharp contrasts between the vitality of real estate
markets in different areas of the country. While the East and
West coasts enjoyed a period of growth, the Southwestern
region of the United States experienced one of the worst
recessions in living memory. This thesis asks: how have
development companies in Texas responded to the down market of
the 1980s?
Our objective in this thesis is to answer this question and to
analyze the history of the Texas real estate market in the
1980s. The confluence of a number of factors set against an
unreserved optimism shared by many participants in the
development field, resulted in a quick deterioration of the
Texas markets. This was a grand game of musical chairs.
However this was a game where some people heard the music stop
long before others did and set about restructuring and
diversifying their organizations. Others kept marching along
in a musical reverie that stopped abruptly, rudely leaving the
unprepared developers, bankers and investors standing about
blaming each other for their problems. Developers in other
parts of the country should listen to and learn from the
experiences of Texas. Developers who take heed of the old
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adage "it is easier to learn from others' mistakes than to
experience those mistakes yourself," should benefit.
our research was conducted by examining literature and
interviewing 35 professionals involved in the real estate
business in the State of Texas. We talked extensively with
the principals of ten development companies (see Appendix A
for company descriptions) that had been active in the "boom"
and "bust" cycle in Texas real estate. They were primarily
involved in the development of office, industrial and/or
multi-family properties. Seven of these companies were listed
in the National Real Estate Investor's "Top 100 Developer
Survey 1988". Additionally, we visited with several Texas-
based consultants, bankers, brokers, and pension fund
advisors. Our objective was to gain a clear understanding as
to why the Texas real estate market declined, and how
developers adjusted to changes in the marketplace.
The following time-line illustrates three distinct stages
which occurred during the Texas real estate cycle of the
1980s. This thesis examines these phases in chronological
order.
GLORY DAYS INITIAL REACTION RESTRUCTURINGDIV ERSIFIC ATION
79 80 81 82 83 .84 85 86 87 88
YEAR
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In Chapter One, we look at the market conditions existing in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the reasons why developers
were building at an accelerating pace during this period. In
addition, we examine the conditions during the mid-1980s
contributing to the market's deterioration.
In Chapter Two, we analyze how and why Texas developers
reacted as they did during the initial stages of decline. In
Chapter Three we examine how these developers restructured
during the decline and to what extent they have been
successful. Chapter Four analyzes the diversification
techniques utilized by Texas developers in the down market.
Finally, we examine how the down market has affected the
industry and the lessons which developers can learn from the
Texas real estate debacle of the 1980s.
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CHAPTER 1: FROM "BOOM" TO "BUST"
The late 1970s and early 1980s represent a period when
developers in Texas enjoyed prosperity and wealth. Everything
was falling into place: there was a heightened demand for
their product; there were very few constraints on their
ability to deliver new buildings; credit was in ample supply;
and generous tax regulations allowed them to syndicate equity,
generating substantial upfront profits. Gradually, the
positive forces which drove the market between 1975 and 1982
began to erode. Between 1981 and 1986 the amount of vacant
suburban office space in Houston increased nine-fold, from 4
million square feet to 36 million square feet. In fact, in
1986, the amount of vacant office space in suburban Houston
exceeded by three times the amount of occupied space in the
central business district of Baltimore, Maryland. The
occupancy rate of suburban office space in Houston fell from
94% in 1981 to 71% in 1986.
As overbuilding became pronounced and vacancies escalated,
developers saw a drop in rents as well as a demand by tenants
for more generous concessions. Developers in Texas
experienced a fundamental economic problem: supply exceeded
demand. For a variety of reasons, the disparity between
supply and demand widened, resulting in further deterioration
of the real estate markets throughout Texas and the rest of
the Southwest.
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A.
The Cyclical Nature of Real Estate Development:
Regional real estate markets are cyclical because they are
closely tied to both the regional economy and the
national/global economy. Development projects are local in
nature and thus depend upon the demand within a specific
market. However, the national/global economy can affect the
vitality of projects either through fluctuations in interest
rates, inflationary expectations, or a heightened demand for a
specific product in which a region has a monopoly on
producing.
The more diversified a regional economy is, the less prone its
real estate market is to fluctuations. Admittedly, there are
likely to be fluctuations within certain sub-markets.
However, these fluctuations are often driven by developers and
their perception, or lack thereof, of demand within a given
marketplace.
Population shifts and demographic make-up also contribute to
altering real estate markets. For instance, in the late 1960s
and 1970s, there was an increase in people and companies
migrating to the Sunbelt states. This created opportunities
for developers in Texas. At the same time, the make-up of the
work force was changing. Two income families were becoming
the norm and with more women entering the work force, there
was an increase in the demand for office space. On a global
scale technological innovation, fluctuations in exchange
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rates, trade regulations, and fiscal deficits impacted on the
economy of the United States, and in turn, the real estate
industry. Changes in these factors created disequilibrium
within real estate markets and resulted in either prosperity
or down cycles.
Predicting real estate cycles is problematical and when a
market turns down, so is its duration. Economic conditions
dictate the vitality of markets. Even though positive signs
within a specific region's economy may exist, negative factors
may contribute to a further deterioration within the market.
The importance of market cycles must not be overlooked because
they create opportunities for developers/investors and they
alter the way in which developers conduct their business.
Change creates opportunity. Developers who react to change
either through perception or by chance often are able to
garner benefits through positioning themselves to take
advantage of an opportunity. When changes occur, businesses
must adapt in order to compete effectively.
The Glory Days:
For the development industry in Texas the late 1970s and early
1980s represented a "boom" period. On the demand side the
economy was expanding fed largely by a growth in the oil
business, an in-migration of people, and a dramatic rise in
the number of women in the work force. This led to an
increase in the absorption of office space, a heightened
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demand for residential units, and an increase in the
consumption of goods and services which positively impacted
the demand for retail space.
"Everyone felt oil was going to $50. Everyone was
riding on the top of the world and credit was
everywhere." (Hugh Caraway, Senior Vice President,
Property Company of America)
"We came out of the mid-seventies in a flourish."
(Trammell Crow, Founder, Trammell Crow Company)
On the supply side, there were few barriers to entry. Credit
and land were in ample supply. The banks and S&Ls were
uncharacteristically aggressive in lending money which fueled
the increase in building. In addition, the lack of strict
zoning regulations, coupled with a lenient approvals process
made it easy for developers to locate a site and begin
construction.
Tax legislation also played an important role in motivating
developers to build. The tax syndication business enabled
developers to pocket money upfront and investors to realize
enormous tax savings. Syndication was the impetus behind many
developments between 1981 and 1985.
"We were no different than anyone else. We would
get a loan for 90% of the project cost and syndicate
half of the ownership for an additional 30%. We
would consistently create a 20% profit upon project
completion. After the Tax Act of 1981, syndication
was really the business." (Hugh Caraway, Property
Company of America)
In addition, people's expectations, optimism, and emotions
fueled the business.
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"Developers always see the glass half full, not half
empty." (Paisley Boney, Senior Vice President,
Prentiss Properties)
People expected that the rise in land and oil prices would
continue. This fueled speculation and brought outsiders
unfamiliar with the development business into the industry.
Many people perceived real estate as the vehicle through which
they could make fortunes.
The real prosperity which Texas developers experienced lasted
from 1975 to 1983. In the latter years, warning signals began
to arise, first in Houston, then in Austin and San Antonio and
finally in Dallas. According to one Texas developer:
"Prudent investors and developers went to the
sidelines in 1984 but rookie developers surfaced to
replace the old pros."
optimism was evident throughout the different markets and many
developers continued to build. Between the years 1980 and
1985 approximately 85 million square feet of office space was
built in Houston. In fact, during this five year period
developers in Houston built one-half of the space which
currently exists in that city.
While some saw troubles ahead, no one really grasped the
severity of what was about to occur. In the minds of many,
the real estate industry during 1982-83 remained a bright spot
in the economy. Banks experiencing trouble with their oil and
agricultural loans saw it as an opportune time to allocate
assets into real estate. Developers were concerned, but not
enough to cease building.
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"In 1982, we saw the overbuilding and the decline
coming. However, on a scale of 1 to 10, we saw a 4.
What we actually received was a 9.9." (Louis Sklar,
Executive Vice President, Gerald D. Hines Interests)
The Cause of the Decline:
The problem Texas developers faced starting in 1982 was that
supply had clearly outgrown demand. The factors which
contributed to an over-supply were: the Tax Act of 1981, which
allowed for lucrative syndication deals; an over-supply of
credit; the lack of sufficient barriers to entry; and
optimistic attitudes which motivated developers to build.
"The development train was running down the track...
the only way it could stop was to crash." (Louis
Sklar, Gerald D. Hines Interests)
"The mid-1980s was like a plane crash to the
developers. If only one thing goes wrong, you can
still land the plane, however, if three or four
problems occur simultaneously, you are headed for a
crash landing. The decline in the price of oil, the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the massive overbuilding
all happened in sequence, causing a tail spin that
you couldn't pull out of." (Hugh Caraway, Property
Company of America)
The Tax Act of 1981 had an enormous impact, not only on Texas
and other Southwestern markets, but also nationally. The Tax
Act stimulated the real estate development business in the
early 1980s and was partially responsible for the "boom" in
Texas, but it contributed eventually to the demise of many
developers. The reason, quite simply, was that it was abused.
The Tax Act loosened regulations regarding the depreciation of
properties and allowed projects to be syndicated so that the
tax benefits could be passed through to investors. The tax
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benefits were so generous that demand for syndicated real
estate deals from an investment standpoint was high. Wealthy
individuals were able to shelter their income from taxes by
taking substantial write-offs which were often many times in
excess of their original investment. There was no delineation
between active, passive, and portfolio income that we know
today. Essentially, the Tax Act of 1981 created a deep pool
of capital for developers.
"The Tax Act of 1981 was criminal. The tax breaks
that were given created a huge influx of capital and
consequently uneconomic, tax driven development."
(Louis Sklar, Gerald D. Hines Interests)
"The Tax Act of 1981 was really a mistake because it
allowed tax benefits to make economic sense out of
development...it resulted in a lot of overbuilding."
(Jerry Bonner, Treasurer, Paragon Group)
Many developments occurred solely for tax benefits and the
fees which the developer generated in return for building,
leasing, and managing the project. When Congress passed the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, the effect on real estate development
was dramatic. Indeed, the effect was even more pronounced in
Texas where developers have a higher percentage of their total
costs in the construction of the building rather than in the
land. In the Northeast and California, land values often
represent a higher percentage of the total cost of a project
than they do in the Southwest. Since land is not a
depreciable asset for tax purposes, developers in Texas
received greater benefits due to the loose regulations of
depreciation, than did their counterparts in other parts of
the country. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reclassified income
into three different levels and lengthened depreciation
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schedules. The deals which were created for tax purposes no
longer made economic sense after 1986.
"The problem is that the Tax Reform Act of 1986
effectively eliminated all of the tax motivated
investors (tax freaks) from the marketplace and that
poor economic deals which may in prior times have
been bailed out by the use of tax syndication will
now have to stand on their own merit,' which very
often are minimal." (Ken Townsend, Managing Partner
- Dallas office, Kenneth Leventhal & Company)
Supply of Credit:
In addition to the lack of stability which the government
created through alterations in tax legislation, changes were
also taking place in the lending practices of financial
institutions which further contributed to the overbuilding
problem. The deregulation of the S&L industry allowed the
institutions to lend on commercial real estate ventures. A
major dilemma existed within many of the S&L's: lending
officers often were inexperienced in evaluating commercial
development, yet their compensation was based on the number of
deals they originated and the amount of front-end fees they
collected. Frequently, lending officers were more interested
in their volume of lending and the amount of fees they
collected than in the quality and feasibility of their loans.
The S&Ls dealt primarily with third tier developers and class
"C" properties. While class "A" buildings do not compete with
class "C" buildings, fluctuations in rental values resulting
from massive overbuilding were felt throughout the market.
When third tier developers were forced to drop their rents to
remain competitive, it ultimately impacted the top tier
developers. When tenants saw rents dropping, they visualized
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it as an across the board phenomena rather than a single
event.
"The lenders are partially responsible for the
problems we have... they loaned lots of money to
people who had no experience and little judgement."
(Trammell Crow, Trammell Crow Company)
In addition, commercial banks altered their lending practices,
and this contributed to the over-supply of credit available to
developers. Throughout the 1980s, many banks began to make
open-ended loans without the permanent takeouts which had been
traditionally required, thus making themselves susceptible to
market risk. The banks became long term lenders by default,
without adequately knowing how to underwrite long-term leases.
Furthermore, as the outlook of the agriculture and the oil
businesses became bleak, banks began to shift more of their
assets into real estate.
"Developers are programmed to build and lenders are
programmed to lend. Everyone felt that their case
was special and for one reason or another they would
succeed." (Bill Cooper, President, Paragon Group)
"Real estate lenders at commercial banks complained
about the risks they were taking but closed their
eyes and made deals to earn fees and contribute to
corporate earnings, which was their real mission."
(Larry Melody, President, L.J. Melody & Company)
In the late 1970s and early 1980s real estate loans became
some of the most profitable assets within a bank's portfolio.
As a result, the senior management of these institutions
emphasized the importance of loan growth in real estate. When
problems began to -appear, many commercial banks were caught in
an unpleasant situation concerning the land loans which they
had made.
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"Developers have a certain power of persuasion.
They indicated to the banks that unless they could
get money to develop, that the cost to carry their
land loans would sink them. Together, the
developers and the banks decided to roll the dice.
The banks would lend the money to pay off the land
loans since there seemed to be no alternative. By
doing this, the banks also kept a bad land loan from
becoming a non-performer." (Steve Field, Executive
Vice President, Texas Commerce Bank)
Many banks stayed away from charging off loans in order to
"dress up" their financial statements. Investors in the early
1980s were already aware of the increase in the level of
non-performing loans held by the Texas banks due to problems
with the regional economy. Classifying loans as
non-performing and then charging them off against income would
have increased investor awareness and negatively impacted the
banks' cost of funds. Thus, banks often rolled their land
loans over into construction loans. This resulted in more
unnecessary building construction, and contributed further to
the problems within the banking system in Texas.
Lack of Barriers to Entry:
Aside from the problems associated with changes in tax
legislation and the over-supply of credit, a problem which was
unique to the Southwest was the lack of barriers to entry
within the development industry. The absence of zoning
regulations and the availability of land made it easy for
developers to locate a site and begin construction. In the
Southwest there is a general lack of governmental control with
regards to zoning, land use and entitlements. If zoning is in
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place, developers can often get it changed quickly. In the
Northeast and California, however, strict zoning and
architectural regulations are prevalent.
In addition, the advent of linkage fees, requiring developers
to compensate a community for the external effects of their
project, has created barriers to entry in other parts of the
country. In more cases than not, developers in the Northeast
and California must have deep pockets and a proven track
record in order to undertake a project. Such governmental
regulations limit the supply of product and help maintain a
supply/demand equilibrium. However, such regulations are rare
in Texas to this day. Whether these regulations are right or
wrong is a question open to debate. However, the fact is they
do serve as barriers to entry by lengthening the development
process and making it more difficult and more expensive to
obtain final approval on a project.
Optimistic Attitudes:
Coupled with the conditions which led to an over-supply of
product was a factor rarely mentioned in print; optimistic
attitudes. Egos, confidence and greed played a major role in
the problem of overbuilding in Texas during the early 1980s.
"Greed had to play in the overbuilding. Everyone
was playing a volume game or a big building game."
(Paul Hinch, President, Property Company of America)
An opinion frequently offered by developers was that
development was the only thing they knew how to do. It's hard
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for developers not to build. Many developers commented that
they were guilty of being overly optimistic.
Decline in Product Demand:
While developers were seeking and finding building
opportunities at a frenetic pace, tenant demand failed to grow
fast enough to support the new developments. In 1982
approximately 23 million square feet of office space was built
in Houston, while only 8 million square feet was absorbed. As
the market declined, there were many tenant foreclosures which
further hurt property values and ultimately the developers.
The problem was especially severe in markets such as Houston,
where many businesses were involved in oil and gas exploration
and production. The posted price of West Texas Intermediate
Crude fell gradually from $39 a barrel in 1980 to $28 a barrel
in late 1985. In early 1986, the price per barrel collapsed
to $13 when OPEC attempted to increase market share at the
expense of price per unit. As oil prices declined, businesses
failed and/or sold off divisions. It was extremely difficult
for oil production companies to remain profitable when prices
"nose dived". As a result, the number of domestic working
rigs declined from a high of 4,520 in 1981 to approximately
700 in June of 1986.
Developers found that their tenant base was not immune to the
cyclical nature of the economy. In 1982, tenants began to
contract by laying off employees and by reducing the amount of
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space they leased. The following graph illustrates the sharp
drop which occurred in Houston's total employment.
Total Employment
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The "bust" had occurred. The gravity and length of the down
market took many developers by surprise. Development is a
cyclical business, but everybody thought that the down cycle
was only going to be a short-term phenomena.
"Nobody knew the hole would get so deep or so wide."
(Don Shine, Regional Partner, Paragon Group)
"Everyone forgot about Economics 101... that $1 in
circulation is worth $7, and that it can work in
reverse." (Don McCrory, Senior Vice President,
Gerald D. Hines Interests)
What occurred was a total reversal in the forces which
inspired development. The Tax Act of 1981, the lack of
barriers to entry, the speculative lending practices of
financial institutions, and the greed and carelessness of some
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developers led to a massive over-supply of product. Tenant
demand evaporated as the regional economy turned down, and the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 cut off the benefits which many
developers and investors had enjoyed. The fact that all of
these problems occurred in sequence contributed to the
severity of the problem.
In the following chapter, we analyze the reactions of
developers during the initial stages of decline. When rents
fell below levels at which developers could meet their debt
obligations, they were forced to restructure. In Chapter
Three we examine how developers restructured from a
management, financial and marketing standpoint. In Chapter
Four we study how developers have diversified both
geographically and functionally in order to generate
alternative sources of revenue.
WORKS CITED IN CHAPTER ONE
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CHAPTER 2: THE INITIAL REACTION
In the early stages of the down market, there were three
themes recurring in case after case: the ignorance of warning
signals; the difficulty in exiting from the business; and the
emotional issues which weighed heavily on the decisions of
many developers.
Ignorance of the Warning Signals:
Most developers recognized that in 1983 the Texas real estate
market was deteriorating. Nonetheless, most admit they did
not take steps to prepare for it. Essentially, the developers
misjudged the severity of the recession and initially most
felt they could simply "ride out" the downturn. As in the
past, developers thought that a strong growth in market demand
and high inflation would "bail out" even the marginal
projects. Most believed the down market at the beginning was
a short term "blip", not a massive overbuilding.
The most successful companies were the ones which reacted to
market conditions quickly and thoughtfully. The development
process can be a lengthy one, even in states such as Texas.
Therefore, if a developer begins a project when warning
signals exist, by the time the project comes on line, the
market may have severely deteriorated. For instance, in
Houston in 1982-83 there were approximately 46 million square
feet of office space completed, while during the same time
period, absorption was less than 18 million square feet. The
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result was that the market's office occupancy rate declined
from 90% to 77% in only a 24 month period.
Developers who had projects coming on line in 1982 and 1983
felt the effects of a downturn in the regional economy. The
following graph illustrates that Houston's "index of leading
indicators" started its downward slide in mid-1981, and
actually reached its low point in late 1982. The warning
signals were there for those that took the time to notice.
Index of Leading Indicators
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Timing is critical in many businesses, however it is
especially important in industries such as real estate
development where there is a time interval between when an
opportunity is perceived and when a product is finally
delivered. Therefore, early recognition of harbingers to
decline is important, because it allows developers to have
more flexibility in determining their strategy.
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"Once things start going down, your opportunities
for solutions narrow." (Don Williams, Managing
Partner, Trammell Crow Company)
If a developer chooses to ignore the warning signs and market
conditions deteriorate, the competition will dictate how the
developer reacts. If, however, developers react early to
changing market conditions, they are likely to be in a
stronger position from a competitive standpoint.
In addition, developers should recognize their tendency to be
optimistic when making market projections.
"In fairness, I believe all developers owe it to
themselves to prepare a worst case, best case, and
most probable case projection for his real estate
company. I would caution here that it has been our
experience that internal cash flow projections have
in many instances been too optimistic." (Ken
Townsend, Kenneth Leventhal & Company)
Developers should pay closer attention to their downside risk.
They must evaluate economic conditions, local demographics and
expected competition. They need to analyze what might happen
under several different scenarios. The Paragon Group, under
the guidance of Bill Cooper, recognized in the early 1980s
that problems existed within given markets. A prominent
Dallas based developer stated:
"When Paragon stopped building in Texas in 1984, the
competition thought they were foolish and that they
would no longer be a player... today Paragon is being
applauded and the same critics think Cooper is a
genius. Paragon's position soon became obvious, to
remain liquid. Cooper decided that if things didn't
continue to go well, that he didn't want to go
broke."
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Exit Barriers:
We found that there were three factors which served as
barriers to firms leaving the development business: sizeable
overhead, competitive forces, and the length of the
development process.
In the good times, many developers integrated vertically. For
instance, some companies had established construction and/or
architectural divisions. As a result, they had employed more
people to staff the new businesses they had entered. When the
real estate market turned soft, it was hard for them to cover
their overhead. They had to try to find ways to employ
profitably these workers in other phases of the business or
let them go. Either result can be expensive and stressful.
Competitive forces also make it difficult to exit the
business. If developers decide to liquidate in order to raise
cash in tough periods, it is unlikely that they stand alone in
their predicament. For instance, in Texas, many developers
were forced to sell a portion of their portfolios during
difficult periods. The market outlook was not strong and
investors were picking up buildings at only a fraction of
their replacement cost. Hugh Caraway of Property Company of
America indicated that their company wanted to sell all of
their assets in 1985. However, since prices were falling so
rapidly, it was hard for them to get what they thought was a
fair price.
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"We would be negotiating a price, but the market
kept declining and potential buyers would
consistently keep reducing the offer price... we
didn't have the time or financial staying power to
be tough negotiators." (Hugh Caraway, Property
Company of America)
Foresight and timing are critical, especially when assets are
illiquid. Unfortunately, many developers didn't have the
option to hold their assets and were forced to sell at the
most inopportune time.
The length of the development process often times inhibits
developers from exiting the business. A developer may become
financially committed to a project by buying a site or signing
a lease after which market conditions deteriorate. When
analyzing projects, developers should look for more than one
way out of the deal. Developers should look to optioning
ground, and only committing themselves if the costs are not
exorbitant, at the last possible moment. A developer becomes
vulnerable if emotionally attached to a project during the
planning and development phase. As a result, it is easy for
one to make a poor judgement on a project's viability.
"Many times when the market begins to decline, the
deal is in progress and the land has been
purchased... because we have often been involved in
the deal for so long, it is emotionally hard and
very expensive to stop the development process."
(Ray Morgan, Executive Vice President, The
Travelers)
Emotional Issues:
Pride plays an important role in development. In the past,
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many developers had been reluctant to sell off properties or
to curb the growth of their companies. Some developers tried
to hold onto their properties without restructuring for fear
of letting their competition know that they were in trouble.
One developer stated:
"You never know who is swimming naked until the tide
goes out."
When a company restructures, the competition is bound to find
out some of the confidential details of a developer's
corporate and financial position. It was difficult for some
developers to come to grips with this fact and, as a result,
some waited until the last possible moment to acknowledge
publicly that they were in trouble. As one developer noted:
"It is simply human nature to want to avoid or
postpone the public embarrassment that goes with
acknowledging failure."
Most developers agreed that the most difficult part of
managing in decline was the emotional decisions which were
involved. A common response from developers was "it is
difficult to tell yourself and your people to stop doing
business.. .that's all we know how to do". It was a personal
embarrassment for most developers to give properties back to
lenders. According to one prominent developer:
"The hardest thing about defaulting on a loan is the
phone calls that you have to make to lenders who
have counted on you and whom you have relationships
with. By making the phone calls, you admit to
yourself that you can't do it and then you let the
rest of the world know."
Developers who experienced project failures were as concerned
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about the emotional effects as they were about the financial
repercussions. One developer stated:
"When I realized that we were not going to make it
and were going to fail, I told my wife that I needed
to get out of this business... I suggested that we go
to Vermont and buy an inn and enjoy life. Everyone
had self doubts. Some of my friends could not look
me in the face because they were so distraught about
failing... marriages fell apart. When your company
is failing, it is an incredible personal
destruction.. .it's not the money, it's the ego
that's crushed."
The developers who experienced difficulties ignored the
warning signals which existed in the early 1980s. Many chose
to disregard the negative signs for emotional reasons. When
they finally realized that they had to react, exit barriers
inherent in the industry, their competition, and the
relationships they had with lenders forced them to restructure
or diversify.
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CHAPTER 3: RESTRUCTURING
Despite the warning signs developers reacted slowly to the
market downturn in Texas. However, when rents fell below a
level where developers could no longer meet their debt
payments, developers were forced to react. Some brought in
equity partners, while others restructured their debt
obligations. In most companies, however, the management
structure remained the same. This chapter examines how
developers have or have not restructured from a
organizational, financial, ownership and marketing
perspective.
organizational Restructuring:
The down market in Texas did not force developers to make
changes to the management structure of their companies because
most development companies in Texas are privately held. The
partners of the organizations were the managers and owners and
they alone made the decisions. As a result, they sought other
ways to remedy their troubles apart from changing management
and removing themselves.
Many development companies were forced to shift the focus of
their operations to seek alternative sources of revenues.
While these companies expanded into other areas of development
either through functional, product or geographic
diversification, their basic management hierarchy tended to be
the same post-crash as it was pre-crash. The subtle changes
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which were observed within the management structure of
organizations had to do more with a change in the operations
of the company than philosophical differences between
partners.
In a response to the down market, many development companies
such as Gerald D. Hines Interests and Property Company of
America, centralized their cost and financial controls. As a
result, the upper management became more involved in the day
to day operations of the company. The style of their
management changed rather than the structure of their
management hierarchy. The managing partners became more
"hands on".
Throughout the 1980s many Texas development companies were
structured as a series of individual partnerships. Partners
were compensated with a minimal salary and an equity interest
in the buildings for which they were responsible. Therefore,
in a strong market an ambitious partner's compensation could
be sizeable. Young partners were often optimistic and tried
to push deals through the pipeline. In fact, as a young
partner of a national development company stated:
"The regional partners were under pressure to
develop...if you didn't develop, you didn't make
money and you risked losing your job."
Often when properties got in trouble and suffered cost
overruns or operating deficits, the financial liability had to
be covered by the older senior partners since the junior
partners often failed to meet their share of cash calls.
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Financial Restructuring:
In a declining market developers are often faced with
liquidity problems and forced to restructure financially.
They do so in two different ways: judicially or
non-judicially. When problems first started to arise in
Texas, national and regional developers tended to negotiate
individual relief on specific properties with each lender.
However, as times worsened and more deals experienced
problems, "workout" consultants were hired to negotiate a
global restructuring of the entire portfolio. An irony was
that companies whose financial conditions were weak, often had
a better chance of negotiating a viable "workout" than did
companies who were current on their debt obligations.
A non-judicial restructure, commonly referred to as a
"workout", is a complex process which requires full
cooperation between the developer and those creditors who have
a financial interest in the developer's projects. Developers
generally prefer a "workout" because: (i) they avoid the
negative publicity of a foreclosure or bankruptcy; (ii) they
may avoid the significant income tax liability resulting from
a foreclosure or bankruptcy "sale"; (iii) they generally
retain leasing and management activities at market rate fees;
(iv) they have a chance to wait out the down markets and
perhaps recover a part of their equity investment and; (v)
they delay "settling up" on any personal liability or
guarantees on the debt.
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"It would be unlikely that a knowledgeable debtor
would continue to struggle with a property having
limited upside potential, a very real potential of a
future deficiency and no ability to pay recourse
liabilities or his federal income taxes. That would
put the debtor in a position of having to file for
protection. If you are an unsecured or under-
secured creditor, you are entitled to participate on
a par passu basis (meaning on an equal basis with
all other creditors) in the residual interests of a
liquidated bankruptcy... most of those residual
interests cover only a fraction of the deficiency
held by the creditors." (Ken Townsend, Kenneth
Leventhal & Company)
Developers and consultants alike suggested that the borrower's
plan should stress full disclosure from both a personal and
corporate financial standpoint and be directed at all of the
developer's lenders simultaneously. To proceed with a
"workout" there were two initial hurdles to be overcome:
creditors had to trust and have confidence in the developer's
ability; and the debtors had to prove to the creditors that
the rewards under a "workout" were greater than under a
liquidation.
"In 1986, we scheduled all debt and all assets and
went to our lenders... we revealed a plan that showed
we would not be able to meet our debt obligations
and that it would be in the best interest of the
lenders to work with us... what we got out of the
restructure was our survival." (Robert Duncan,
President, Transwestern Property Company)
A Houston-based developer pointed out that in a workout
situation the insurance company lenders were much more
sophisticated than the banks and tougher negotiators, even
though they typically lent on a non-recourse basis. The
insurance companies generally had liens on assets that were
complete and partially leased. They didn't have regulatory
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accounting problems to worry about and they had the ability to
hold the real estate for the long-term.
Robert Duncan of Transwestern Property Company indicated that
the first thing he did when he realized he had to restructure
financially, was to develop a plan. The plan was consistent
with Transwestern's survival and still in the selfish best
interest of the lenders. Once Transwestern decided upon a
course of action, they immediately set up a conference with
each of the banks, one at a time. Duncan indicated that the
meetings often involved everyone from the loan officer to the
bank president. In every situation it was necessary for
Transwestern to show the lenders that it was in the lenders
best interest to do the workout.
Don McCrory of Gerald D. Hines Interests indicated that when
the market first began to decline, Hines subsidized properties
by financing operating deficits on individual properties out
of their own pockets. When it became clear that a recovery
was a long way off, they changed their philosophy. They
identified their non-recourse' loans and either restructured
them in the form of a cash flow mortgage, or gave the
properties back to the lenders. McCrory stated that Hines was
no longer willing to come out-of-pocket if the properties
required substantial cash to be contributed, unless they could
realistically predict a recovery of the new cash invested. If
necessary, they were willing to forfeit their real or imputed
equity to the lenders in order to preserve their cash
position. Louis Sklar of Hines indicated that by 1986 the
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company had decided that it was not in their best interest to
keep feeding the deals where there was no personal recourse
and little chance to recover additional new investment
capital.
"Unless we stopped paying, not a single one of our
permanent lenders would do anything to alleviate our
short-term cash flow problems. The only error Hines
made, was not restructuring some of our troubled
Texas properties earlier... we lost a lot of money by
carrying deals." (Don McCrory, Gerald D. Hines
Interests)
Even though they were current on all of their debt obligations
with the lenders, Hines stopped paying on some loans in order
to get the lenders' attention. As a result, Hines was able to
renew and extend some of their existing notes. Indeed, the
Hines organization was not alone in their predicament. In
many cases, developers were frustrated that they could not
work with lenders until they had stopped paying on their debt
obligations.
Although many of the national or regional developers in Texas
were able to restructure their problem loans in the form of a
workout, others were less successful. Many properties were
foreclosed upon as a result of the lenders' lack of confidence
in the developers' abilities. Some properties suffered the
same fate as developers were unsuccessful in establishing
viable alternatives to foreclosure. As indicated by the graph
on the following page, the number of foreclosures in the
Houston area increased from approximately 100 per year in
1982, to 2,700 per year in 1987.
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Developers that were solvent and perceived by the creditors as
being able to pay, were less likely to restructure financially
than if they had been insolvent. These companies were often
held to a higher standard and only able to partially
restructure their debt portfolios with lenders because of
their strong relationships. For instance, Paragon was able to
gain some "relief" in the form of loan extensions, accruals
and/or interest rate adjustments. They went to the creditors
not asking for forgiveness of debt, but instead, requested
that the creditors work with them to alleviate some of their
cash flow problems. Similar to that of most developers,
Paragon's stance, as indicated by Doug Knaus, Vice President
and Manager of Paragon's Houston office, was to "keep their
powder dry to pay recourse lenders". In other words, their
priority was to ensure that they had sufficient means to meet
their recourse debt obligations.
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Marketing Restructure:
"The key to survival in the real estate development
business is marketing (leasing). The buildings need
to be kept full, and that is why we have so many
marketing and management people in Houston today."
(Tom Simmons, Group Managing Partner, Trammell Crow
Company)
One of the initial problems which occurred when the market
started to decline was that developers started giving away
free rent as a marketing technique.
"Free rent became a marketing tool at first and then
became an alternative financing vehicle." (Steve
Jaggard, President, The Horne Company)
In effect, developers were capitalizing the tenant by
providing free rent, signing bonuses and moving allowances.
The problem which many developers faced was that the tenant
would move out when the free rent period expired.
Developers claimed that they could not afford not to renew an
existing tenant (on a short term basis), since the additional
costs associated with releasing and refitting the space would
be very large. One of the first things Hines did when the
market started to decline, was to renegotiate leases with all
of their existing tenants whose leases were expiring within
the following 12 to 24 month period. Hines wanted to lock
tenants in at current market rates since they expected the
rents to decline in the near future. Developers learned
quickly that they were not willing to put in additional tenant
improvements or give free rent unless they were sure that the
tenant would pay after the free rent period expired.
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"Times got so bad in Texas that developers were
willing to lease space if the present value of the
lease agreements were $1 greater than if the space
had remained empty. The impetus for developers to
do these deals was to create leasing momentum and to
re-sign the tenant after the initial lease
expiration, hopefully under improved market
conditions." (Louis Sklar, Gerald D. Hines
Interests)
As a means of leasing in a down market, developers began to
give up equity to major tenants in an attempt to entice them
to lease space. Developers also provided above standard
tenant improvements, moving allowances, up-front capital
disbursements and rent "step ups" as ways to lure tenants to
their buildings.
Ownership Restructuring:
In an effort to limit their exposure in certain projects, some
developers brought in joint venture partners such as insurance
companies and pension funds. Joint ventures were common
before the decline, however, their frequency increased as the
market deteriorated. When institutional partners were given
an equity position in a development opportunity, the
development partner usually had a non-recourse position or was
liable for only a small percentage of the project cost. Louis
Sklar indicated that Hines always would have a partner or
permanent "takeout" before development would commence.
Similarly the Paragon Group, from 1979 to 1983, as a way of
mitigating risk, brought in joint venture partners for each of
their new developments around the country. In fact, Paragon
benefited from doing joint ventures while the market was
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strong. Consequently, they were better able to withstand
recent market pressures than some of their counterparts.
While many developers took on joint venture partners on a deal
by deal basis, others sold an ownership interest in their
entire real estate portfolio.
"In order to succeed developers must find financial
partners who will provide them with working capital
and the ability to wait out an over-development
period." (Jack McJunkin, President, Centre
Development)
Every company we interviewed, with the exception of one, had
either restructured their financial obligations and/or brought
in an equity partner. Many did so for defensive reasons.
They were in a "cash crunch" and in order to remain liquid had
to look to outside equity sources for assistance.
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CHAPTER 4: DIVERSIFICATION
A common practice among developers in Texas in the 1980s was
to diversify either geographically, functionally, or by
product type. Their objective for undertaking such an effort
was two-fold: to enhance their revenues and 'to mitigate the
risks involved in having all of their "eggs in one basket".
Geographic Diversification:
Developers were sharply divided. Some believed that
geographic diversification was essential for long term
success. Others felt that it was better for developers to
only conduct business in the markets where they had an active
presence. According to a 1987 Urban Land Institute study:
"The decision whether or not to expand
geographically depends upon a number of factors: a
firm's historical practices; the developer's
assessment of the opportunities available in the
home market; the perceived value of geographic
expansion balanced against market risks and; a
firm's organization, philosophy, and structure of
authority".
In other words, prior to expanding geographically, a firm must
analyze the market and determine whether or not they are
capable of undertaking a project in that market.
Developers who diversified geographically typically did so by
attempting to find an opportunity where they had a competitive
advantage. In 1987 Property Company of America, fueled by
their desire to find "in-fill" sites, expanded their
operations to the East Coast, the Southeast and the West
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Coast. PCA's strategy was to hire a local professional who
was familiar with the market. They upgraded their product and
amenities, and by utilizing the same floor plans from one
market to another, had a better control over construction
cost. Their objective was to construct a product that they
knew was attractive in the eyes of institutional buyers.
Other developers such as Transwestern Property Company chose
not to enter markets outside of Texas. Robert Duncan, who
oversees Transwestern's operations, pointed out that it was
too risky to develop in markets they knew nothing about.
Duncan's opinion was that even though one could hire someone
who was familiar with a different market, they were not
willing to accept the risks associated with geographic
diversification. Others indicated that hiring someone to head
a regional office who was unfamiliar with their company was in
itself a risky venture.
The experiences in Texas illustrate that developers should do
what they know how to do best. Developers should not get
involved in projects where they are unfamiliar with the
market. Development is a very local business, and it takes
time and experience to understand a marketplace.
"Developers need to become more niche players... and
find what they are good at. They don't need to go
to new markets or diversify product type in a down
market. When it is hard to make a buck, it is
easier to loose it doing something that you don't
know how to do or in a market you are unfamiliar
with. It is far better to concentrate your
resources on something you know how to do well."
(Richard Price, Managing Partner - Houston office,
Kenneth Leventhal & Company)
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Experience indicates that developers should diversify for
offensive reasons rather than defensive ones. For years,
Gerald D. Hines Interests has stuck primarily to the same
product type (major office buildings or multi-use
developments), yet have expanded their geographic boundaries.
They began their geographic expansion outside of Texas prior
to the decline in the Texas market and have been successful.
They are large enough so that when they enter a market, their
presence is felt. In addition, they were not forced to rush
into projects. They expanded during the good times and this
gave them ample time to understand the intricacies of
different markets.
In other cases, companies had dug larger holes for themselves
because they were diversifying for defensive reasons. Forced
to generate cash to meet existing debt obligations, these
developers explored development opportunities beyond the
State's boundaries in order to generate fee income. This
might have been a successful strategy if the developers had
the time to understand fully the various markets which they
entered. However, the defensive nature of their expansion
shortened their development time frame and caused them to
force the development of projects that were not feasible. As
a result, the companies escalated their existing problems and
negatively affected their reputations with lenders.
Product Diversification:
The reason some Texas developers diversified by product type
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was to broaden their base of opportunity. Many developers
failed with their new products for two primary reasons: their
timing was off; and they became involved in a product type
where they had little or no prior experience. For instance,
when the office and industrial markets in Texas started to
have problems, some developers undertook retail and/or hotel
projects. Unfortunately, the down market encompassed all
facets of the business rather than one specific product type.
A lesson which these developers learned is that they misjudged
the capabilities of their organization. Time after time,
developers indicated that they should not have become involved
in areas of real estate that they knew nothing about. If a
development company is successful and oriented towards
industrial projects, it is incorrect to assume that they will
also be successful if they undertake retail development.
Functional Diversification:
Virtually every development company in Texas sought
alternative means of generating revenue, other than through
the development process. Indeed, most development companies
abandoned speculative development altogether and many shifted
their primary focus to one or more of the following services:
merchant building; asset management; or financial services.
Essentially, development companies in Texas have evolved into
full service real estate companies.
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Merchant Building:
Many real estate developers agree that they are becoming
merchant builders. Merchant builders are developers that
build and deliver a product to the market for a fair price.
They are not long-term real estate investors. In the past, it
was thought that all developers, by instinct, were investment
builders who sought to build and maintain portfolios for long
term growth in net worth.
"Before 1984, developers were vociferous as it
relates to building... our concept was investment
building and we identified with holding onto real
estate for the long term." (Robert Duncan,
Transwestern Property Company)
Hugh Caraway of Property Company of America said that in 1986,
PCA and other developers changed their whole philosophy and
became merchant builders. PCA's objective was to build and
then sell to institutions in order to make short term money
and retain the management of those properties. This change in
strategy was prompted when many of the developers were forced
to sell assets in order to raise the necessary money to keep
paying their outstanding debt obligations.
"Before the Tax Act of 1986 we were all investment
builders who were also in the syndication business".
(Hugh Caraway, Property Company of America)
Asset Management:
When the Texas markets started experiencing a significant
demand and supply imbalance in the mid-1980s, many developers
focused their efforts on full service asset management on
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behalf of third parties. Most of the third parties happened
to be the banks, S&Ls, insurance companies and pension funds
who owned the properties as a result of acquisition by
foreclosure. The Duddlesten Companies, a Houston based
development company which stopped building in 1982, was a
pioneer in this area. In 1975, after a previous down market,
Duddlesten Management was organized to specialize in asset
management. Don Reed, President of Duddlesten Management,
noted that by 1989, the firm employed approximately 2000
people across the country, a substantial increase from the 200
people which were employed in 1982.
The Trammell Crow Company and Transwestern Property Company
have also. been active in the area of third party asset
management. They organized separate divisions to take
advantage of new opportunities available in the marketplace.
Robert Duncan of Transwestern said "our core business is now
third party management". Both Transwestern and the Houston
office of Trammell Crow are larger today as a result of asset
management than they were in the early 1980s. Most developers
who entered third party management succeeded in building their
companies into larger, more diversified organizations.
Financial Services:
As a means of functional diversification, several of the
larger development companies in Texas set up investment
divisions for the purpose of attracting institutional money.
Their objective was to acquire undervalued real estate assets
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in the Southwest. A 1987 Urban Land Institute study suggests:
"Some firms were interested in expanding into other
areas--financial services, investment banking,
management of pension funds--as a way of
diversifying to protect themselves during down
periods of the business cycle".
Robert Dickson, Regional Partner in the Dallas office of
Lincoln Property Company, said that Lincoln is representing
institutional buyers of real estate. Lincoln acts as a
consultant and asset manager and is active in the purchase of
Texas apartment projects. They receive an acquisition fee, an
asset management fee and based upon their performance, could
receive incentive fees upon the sale of the asset. Paragon
Group and Trammell Crow Company have organized investment
groups to raise money from outside sources to purchase
industrial properties in Texas. Through renovation,
management and leasing, these companies seek to create value
in properties.
Of the development companies we spoke with, all had
diversified functionally. They did so to generate revenues in
order to cover their overhead expenses and to keep their
development teams together. Some companies diversified by
product type or geographic location. The ones that were
successful had generally diversified before the down market.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The decade of the 1980s has forced developers to change the
way they conduct their business. Texas developers have
evolved from speculative builders into full service real
estate companies. The availability of capital and tax
legislation led to the "boom". Ironically, these factors were
also the impetus for the deterioration in market conditions.
Developers in Texas forgot that tenant demand should be the
driving force behind development. The down market has
elicited changes within the industry.
Of the ten development companies we met with, all had either
restructured or diversified. As the market deteriorated in
the 1980s, development companies in Texas were forced to take
a defensive posture. They became more attuned to the downside
risks associated with development and in creating other
sources of revenue. The following diagram summarizes the
courses of action which development companies have taken.
OPTIONS FOR DEVELOPERS IN DOWN MARJ(ETS
RESTRUCTURE DIVERSIFICATION
I I I I
II I I
MANAGEMENT FINANCIAL MARKETING OWNERSHIP I
FUNCTIONAL GEOGRAPHICAL PRODUCT
FINANCIAL SERVICES MERCHANT BUILDING ASSET MANAGEMENT
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In many cases, companies approached their problems from two or
more angles. For instance, Transwestern Property Company
restructured their debt obligations and diversified
functionally by placing a strong emphasis on asset management
for third parties.
Whether development companies restructured or diversified,
they all seemed to have had the same objective: to survive the
recession and to preserve their financial condition to the
best of their ability. We found that those companies who were
decisive and responded early to their problems fared better
than those who did not react quickly.
The successful companies were the ones that were creative and
trusted their own instincts. Those companies who were
motivated by the "herd instinct" were the ones who suffered
the most. For instance, one company mentioned that they went
to Nashville because that "was where the action was". They
followed others and built during the upswing. However, when
their project had finally come on line the market had soured
due to an over-supply of product.
Companies such as Paragon, who proceeded cautiously during the
"boom" period, fared better in the "bust". While they may not
have made as much money during the up cycle, Paragon did not
lose as much during the down cycle. Money alone does not
motivate successful organizations.
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"A great company does not have a single vision, it
has multiple visions...it's not just making money,
it's creating jobs and people helping people." (Don
Williams, Trammell Crow Company)
History has taught us that development in Texas is a cyclical
business. In all probability, the business will continue to
be susceptible to economic cycles for two reasons: development
projects tend to be large in scope, and the time lag between
when an opportunity is perceived and when it is acted upon can
be several years. Even the large development companies may
only have five or six projects in the pipeline at one time.
If one of these projects fails, the financial effect on the
company/partnership can be acute.
We predict that in the next fifteen years the real estate
cycles in Texas will not be as dramatic as they have been over
the last fifteen years. The main factor behind our prediction
is that the nature of the business is changing. More equity
and pre-leasing will be required in the future. Developers
are switching from speculative building to fee driven
development. Out of necessity, developers have turned their
attention to creating a service rather than a product. As the
business becomes more service oriented, developers will have
less capital at risk.
"The future is bright for Texas" (H. Ross Perot,
Jr., The Perot Group)
We are optimistic about the opportunities for developers in
the State of. Texas. However, our optimism is qualified. The
experience of the past decade has illustrated a number of
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important lessons:
* Identification of the risks inherent in a deal should be
a top priority.
* Developers should pay attention to warning signals.
* Change creates opportunity. However, developers will
only be able to garner the benefits of change if they are
positioned to take advantage of the change.
* If there are a lack of barriers to entry within a given
marketplace, companies must distinguish their product
from that of their competition, either through a superior
design, price, management or location.
* If developers sign personally on a loan, they should be
prepared to pay the consequences.
* The stimulus behind deals should be tenant demand and not
an artificial influence. Our tax laws have been changed
repeatedly over the last fifteen years and if history is
a good prediction of the future, we can expect changes in
the tax laws over the next decade.
The development business has evolved into a complex industry.
Those that succeed will recognize change and react.
"You have to present Americans with products and
services they see as familiar, yet as new and
wonderful. Know what the market will take, will pay
for, will accept. Then study the situation and
provide what is required. It is as simple and as
complex as that". (Trammell Crow, Trammell Crow
Company)
In the latter part of the 1980s, the Texas real estate markets
were at a low tide. However, by 1989 there were signs which
suggested that a turnaround was imminent. Companies such as
the J.C. Penney Company and American Airlines undertook major
moves to the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Economists were
observing that the Houston economy was diversifying. The
1990s is the dawn of a new era in Texas real estate. Those
who survived the 1980s should be in a strong position to take
advantage of new opportunities.
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APPENDIX A: COMPANIES INTERVIEWED
Trammell Crow Company: The firm consists of three real estate
development companies with offices nationwide: Trammell Crow
Company-Residential; Trammell Crow Company-Commercial;
Trammell Crow Interests. The Dallas-based firm is privately
owned, has regional offices throughout the country, and is the
country's largest development company. The company was
founded in the late 1940s by Trammell Crow and is currently
involved in office, retail, industrial, multifamily,
single-family and hotel development.
Lincoln Property Company: The firm is the country's second
largest privately owned development company. Based in Dallas,
the firm has regional offices throughout the country. The
company was founded by Mack Pogue, who was formerly associated
with the Trammell Crow Company, in the mid-1960s. The firm is
involved in office, industrial, retail and multifamily
development.
Gerald D. Hines Interests: The firm is one of the country's
"Top 15" development companies by 1988 volume of production.
The privately owned company is based in Houston and was
founded by Gerald Hines in the late 1950s. The firm, which
was at one time the country's largest development company, is
primarily involved in the development of office space. Hines
has regional offices across the country.
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Paragon Group: The firm is one of the country's "Top 30"
development companies as measured by 1988 production activity.
The privately owned company was founded by Bill Cooper in the
late 1970s, and is based in Dallas. Paragon has regional
offices in several cities across the country. The firm, whose
principals were formerly associated with Lincoln Property
Company, is involved in office, industrial, multifamily and
retail development.
Property Company of America: The firm is one of the country's
"Top 30" development companies by 1988 production activity.
The privately owned company is based in Tulsa, Oklahoma and
was founded by Paul Hinch in the early 1980s. The firm, whose
principals were formerly associated with Lincoln Property
Company, has regional offices in several cities across the
country. PCA is involved in the development of office,
multifamily and industrial space.
Prentiss Properties Limited: Formerly Cadillac Fairview, the
firm is currently listed as one of the country's "Top 100"
development companies as ranked by 1988 production activity.
The company was purchased in the late 1980s by Michael
Prentiss and Copley Realty Advisors. Prentiss Properties has
regional offices in several cities across the country and is
involved in the development of office, industrial, hotel and
retail development.
Centre Development Company: Founded by Jack McJunkin in the
late 1970s, the Dallas-based company is currently active in
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the development of office, industrial and retail space. The
firm was one of the country's "Top 100" developers in 1988 and
has a regional office in Austin, Texas.
Transwestern Property Company: The firm is a Houston-based
development company that was founded in the late 1970s by
Robert Duncan. The privately owned company has been active in
the development of office, industrial and retail space. The
firm is currently more active in real estate asset management
than in development. Duncan at one time was affiliated with
the Trammell Crow Company.
Duddlesten Management Company: The firm is a Houston-based
management company which was formed in the mid-1970s. The
company is national in scope and is headed by Don Reed. The
Duddlesten Companies, the parent to the management operation,
was primarily active in the development of office and
industrial properties during the 1970s and early 1980s. The
Duddlesten Companies stopped developing in 1982.
The Perot Group: The firm is a Dallas-based real estate
company which specializes in land development and property
acquisition. The firm was founded in the 1980s by H. Ross
Perot, and is currently headed by H. Ross Perot Jr. The
company is the largest land owner in the Dallas/Fort Worth
area.
Kenneth Leventhal & Company: Founded by Kenneth Leventhal in
the late 1940s, the firm is currently one of the country's
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fifteen largest CPA accounting firms. The firm, which is
based in Los Angeles, has regional offices located throughout
the country. The company specializes in debt restructuring
and consulting for real estate development companies.
L.J. Melody and Company: The firm is a national real estate
investment banking firm which was founded in the late 1970s by
Larry Melody. The company provides financial services related
to commercial property and serves an advisory role to pension
funds and life insurance companies. The firm is headquartered
in Houston and has offices in Dallas, Austin, Los Angeles,
Irvine, San Diego and Denver.
The Horne Company: Headquartered in Houston, the real estate
brokerage firm offers services in the areas of office and
industrial leasing, brokerage, and asset and property
management. The company was founded in the 1920s, and is
currently headed by Steve Jaggard.
Texas Commerce Bank: The Houston-based company is one of the
largest commercial banks in Texas. The firm merged with
Chemical Bank Corporation in the late 1980s. The real estate
department is headed by Steve Field.
The Travelers: The firm is one of the country's largest life
insurance companies. Headquartered in Hartford, Connecticut,
the company was an active participant in Texas real estate in
the 1970s and 1980s.
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